Protecting Minors from Blind Boxes: Procuratorial Public Interest Litigation as a Supplementary Regulatory Mechanism in China

This paper examines how China's procuratorial organs use administrative public interest litigation (APIL) to fill regulatory gaps in the sale of blind boxes to minors. Its central argument is that procuratorial oversight can serve as a supplementary regulatory mechanism where existing administrative rules leave children's psychological and social wellbeing underprotected. The analysis draws on nine cases published by the Supreme People's Procuratorate and provincial procuratorates between 2022 and 2026, all designated as typical or guiding examples on blind-box sales and minor protection, and applies a doctrinal legal framework to these materials.

The paper identifies two principal obstacles to using APIL in this area. The first is that harms to minors are largely psychological, including the gradual formation of gambling attitudes, impulsive spending, and competitive consumption habits, and existing regulations do not clearly establish whether such effects meet the threshold of public interest harm. The second is that supervisory responsibility is dispersed across market supervision, education, and public security departments, with no statute assigning primary authority. To address these problems, procuratorial organs have adopted a preventive interpretation of legal interest impairment, treating blind-box sales as a prospective risk that suffices to establish harm without proof of actual damage, and have reinforced this position through public hearings involving educators, parents, experts, and administrative representatives.

The paper also finds that procuratorial organs address administrative non-performance by combining legal deterrence with institutional collaboration. Pre-litigation recommendations create a credible threat of judicial review that often prompts administrative rectification without litigation, while joint institution-building with market supervision and education authorities produces regional standards and governance mechanisms for school-adjacent sales. The author acknowledges limitations, notably the scarcity of empirical research on the psychological effects of blind boxes on minors, and cautions that procuratorial collaboration may blur the line between legal supervision and administrative governance. The Chinese experience is nonetheless presented as a comparative reference for jurisdictions facing similar regulatory inaction.