Response to Michael Ridge

The philosophical discourse surrounding the ontological status of games and artworks centers on whether these two categories can coexist within a single object. The primary thesis maintains that games and artworks are fundamentally incompatible because they are constituted by distinct, conflicting sets of rules and prescriptions. While critics argue that objects can possess multiple, overlapping functions—such as a urinal being both a functional object and an artwork—this analysis asserts that the constitutive prescriptions of a game, specifically the lusory attitude, are undermined when subjected to the conflicting requirements of an artwork.

The argument relies on the ontological framework established by Bernard Suits, which posits that games are objects partially defined by their rules. Because an artwork prescribes a different mode of engagement than a game, the rules governing the two are not identical. Applying Leibniz’s principle of the identity of indiscernibles, the analysis concludes that if the rules defining a game are altered or superseded by the requirements of an artwork, the resulting object is no longer the original game. Furthermore, the discussion clarifies that games should be viewed as abstract artifacts—entities that are created and maintained through human agency, similar to laws or musical works—rather than mere physical objects.

Methodologically, the analysis rejects the assumption that compatibility should be the default state for all categories. Instead, it focuses narrowly on the specific, internal prescriptions of games and artworks to demonstrate that their functional requirements are mutually exclusive. By distinguishing between internal, constitutive rules and external, incidental norms, the analysis reinforces the conclusion that the specific ontological requirements of a game cannot be satisfied if the object is simultaneously functioning as an artwork.