Response to David Myers

This philosophical discourse addresses the fundamental incompatibility between the definitions of games and artworks, specifically challenging the notion that a single object can simultaneously function as both. The central thesis maintains that the prelusory goals required for game play cannot be reconciled with the nature of artistic appreciation. Because the constitutive rules of a game must be followed to achieve a prelusory goal, any attempt to frame artistic appreciation as a prelusory goal fails, as the rules themselves would become part of the object of appreciation, thereby preventing the goal from being met independently of the prescribed means.

The analysis critiques the counterarguments regarding the potential for "experiencing gameplay" to serve as a valid prelusory goal. It argues that such a definition is logically circular, as the experience of gameplay cannot be both the subject and the object of the player's actions. Furthermore, the discussion clarifies the distinction between lusory and prelusory goals, emphasizing that the inherent inefficiency of games resides in the relationship between constitutive rules and prelusory goals, rather than in the execution of the game itself.

The scope of this inquiry is limited to the theoretical philosophy of games, specifically engaging with the work of Bernard Suits. By rejecting the paradoxes proposed by opposing viewpoints—such as the claims that game play is simultaneously efficient and inefficient or that it can be both art and not-art—the analysis reinforces the necessity of maintaining rigorous logical boundaries. Ultimately, the conclusion asserts that attempts to collapse the distinction between games and art through redefined goals result in logical incoherence, reaffirming the structural differences between the two categories.