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DiGRA
The paper argues that many games now center contemplation and disinvolvement rather than participation. It asks whether this offers players critical distance.
This paper, presented as an extended abstract at DiGRA 2020 by Alina Latypova and Alexander Lenkevich, proposes a philosophical framework for analyzing inaction in computer games. Its central argument is that games increasingly foreground non-action, contemplation, and "disinvolvement" rather than active participation, and that this development carries both critical potential and a risk of co-optation. The authors propose developing an "apraxeology," or theory of inaction, to examine whether such games allow players to achieve distance, contemplation, and a renewed relationship to themselves, or whether inaction has itself become a mechanism of control within a market and an economy that demand constant engagement.
The paper grounds its analysis in philosophical sources, including Agamben's concept of humanity as capable of its own inability, Arendt's distinction between labor, work, and action, Benjamin's contrast between contemplative painting and immersive cinema, and Bataille's notion of ecstasy. It classifies inaction-oriented games into three types: reflective games that break the fourth wall, such as The Stanley Parable and The Beginner's Guide; contemplative games that minimize player activity, such as Dear Esther and Mountain; and zero-player or idle games, such as Game of Life and Cookie Clicker. The authors argue that metagames, which reflexively comment on game conventions, have been absorbed into the market and commodified, with their critical potential often neutralized.
The paper is a theoretical essay rather than an empirical study. It presents no survey data, sample sizes, or quantitative findings, and its scope is limited to a selection of primarily Western digital games from roughly 2002 to 2019, interpreted through a humanities lens. Its principal conclusion is a call for a "philosophical antivirus" that preserves the human capacity for inaction against its exploitation, though the abstract leaves the concrete form of this proposal largely undeveloped.