A Tale of Two Eberts: Videogames and the Arbitrariness of Meaning

The debate surrounding the artistic legitimacy of video games centers on a fundamental conflict between essentialist definitions of art and the subjective, experiential nature of interactive media. Roger Ebert’s long-standing skepticism toward the medium serves as a focal point for this discourse, revealing a tension between the requirement for fixed, author-intended structures and the fluid, player-driven nature of gameplay. While proponents of the medium often emphasize the audience’s subjective encounter as the primary source of meaning, this perspective risks conflating mere experience with the intentional artistic expression traditionally required for a work to be classified as art.

At the core of this ontological struggle is the role of authorial intent. Because games are built upon logical, rule-based systems that remain indifferent to the player’s personal interpretations, they present a unique challenge to traditional aesthetics. Rather than viewing the game itself as art, it is more accurate to categorize the underlying mechanics as a form of material support—akin to a canvas or pigment—that an artist must navigate and transcend to communicate specific meaning. This framework suggests that games do not inherently possess artistic status; instead, they function as tools that require deliberate, intentional application to achieve the status of a cultural artifact.

Ultimately, the pursuit of a universal definition for games as art is secondary to the necessity of rigorous, case-by-case critical analysis. By moving away from the tendency to equate player experience with artistic intent, scholars can better address the medium’s formal challenges. The path forward involves applying established aesthetic principles to the unique constraints of procedural authorship, recognizing that the resistance of game mechanics to human narrative is not an insurmountable barrier, but rather a formal condition that defines the medium’s specific artistic potential.